Kachajian's Rebellion

The story of how one small manufacturere spent six years fighting to save his business from the deadening hand of government export controls -- and won. Sort of.

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WELCOME TO GEORGE KACHAJIAN'S Theater of the Absurd.

You will know you have arrived when you see the marquee, there above the front door of his corporate headquarters at the end of Spruce Street in Oakland, N.J. No, it wasn't planned that way, but it does capture the spirit and essence of the whole long, involved, and contentious drama that's been six years in the making and not finished yet.

Once, those large blue letters announced the company he started 16 years ago as Silicon Technology Corp. (STC). But some months ago, this sign broke in the middle, as if unable to stand the weight of the company's aching frustration any longer: the letters spelling "TECH" fell and shattered on the parking lot below. Now each morning when Kachajian sees this symbol of his plight, he cannot help but mentally review the script as he's lived it thus far. In a rising spiral of incredulity, he will recall how an abrupt shift in American foreign policy suddenly denied him access to foreign markets, and how a foreign competitor used the opportunity both to fill the vacuum overseas and to raid his market in the United States. And he will remember with bitterness the layoffs of workers in Oakland, and the mounting financial losses, and his long hegira through the federal bureaucracy in search of relief.

So it is that George Kachajian comes to work, his $10-million company still dangerously close to collapse. Looking at the marquee, he asks himself, "Who took the 'tech' from my technology?" to which he answers, amazed at the improbability of his own response: "My own government, that's who."

But please come inside: the featured attraction has a lot more to offer -- senators, congressional subcommittees, the Western Alliance; also the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. You will see that the story of George Kachajian's quest for an export license is really only a small vignette played out against a vast backdrop of international trade deficits, East-West competition, and political feuding within the Reagan Administration. Still, it is a vignette that raises disturbing questions: Do the complex controls regulating U.S. exports sacrifice the international competitiveness of American companies, particularly high-tech companies? If our export-control system causes our companies to lose markets, and worse yet, industries, to foreign competitors, then, in the long run are they really protecting our national security? With a trade deficit of $170 billion, can the United States afford to forgo exports that surely run into the billions of dollars that are lost each year to export controls?

The controversy has by no means spent its force, although George Kachajian has now won a victory of sorts against the deadening hand of the Export Administration Act -- the first of its kind in history. And as the news of this victory spreads through the high-tech community, he is being praised as the underdog who beat city hall. But Kachajian never wanted to star in his own melodrama. He wanted to be a businessman.

For 18 years, George S. Kachajian had worked for Dow Corning Corp. in various sales and marketing jobs, first selling silicones for oils, greases, and paint resins, and then silicon, the pure crystalline element used exclusively in the manufacture of semiconductors. His contacts within this new, rapidly growing industry were broad, he was well paid, and his prospects were very promising. But in 1969, he decided to quit. That fall, at a company plant in Hemlock, Mich., Kachajian watched an employee at work on an internal diameter wafering saw, which cuts silicon ingot into thin wafers, one of the first steps in creating semiconductors. For a second, the operator looked away from his work and the saw's diamond blade sliced through the back of his hand and cut off his fingers. Horrified and splattered with blood, Kachajian pulled the man away from the machine and applied a tourniquet. Then and there he decided that "there had to be a better way."

With almost $20,000 in personal savings, Kachajian turned to a machine-tool company in Massachusetts and financed the development of a prototype for a new saw that changed the orientation of the cutting blade, added a protective shield, and rearranged the work flow. In the fall of 1970, funded by $220,000 from friends and relatives and the refinancing of his house, he began to manufacture and sell his new machine. And it was not long before Kachajian realized that he would have to comply with U.S. export regulations, the vagaries of which could hardly be factored into any rational business plan or production schedule.

These days, business on the international level is rarely "strictly business," especially when it involves high tech. During World War II, export controls were used to ensure an adequate supply of various goods and commodities needed to sustain the war effort. But contrary to the original expectations, those controls were left in place long after peace had been declared -- a weapon of the Cold War. The Export Control Act of 1949 finally made official what had been administrative practice, banning the export to communist countries of not only bona fide military equipment, but also dual-use commodities that might have military as well as commercial value. Beginning in 1969, Congresses and Presidents began relaxing those export restrictions, turning a more congenial and expansive face to trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. But this period of detente came to an abrupt halt with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. Caught up in the ebb and flow of the tensions between the superpowers was a small machine-tool company at the end of Spruce Street in Oakland, N.J.

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