It didn't happen that way. A five-sided coalition had created a juggernaut of opposition. Members of the academic, medical, and scientific communities that received federal R&D funds were old allies. Seventy-six organizations, representing these communities, weighed in against the bill with a barrage of mail, telephone calls, and between-session visits. Their links with the fourth side of the coalition, the R&D procurement staff of the various federal agencies, was also an old one. There, civil servants had already successfully stalled the SBIR program through the Carter years so they could keep allocating "their" funds the way they saw fit.Finally, one business group out of the nation's approximately 16,000 trade associations joined the opposition -- the American Electronic Association.
The House Small Business Committee expected opposition from these long-standing beneficiaries of existing policies. To placate them, for example, it wrote specific assurances into the bill -- as had the Senate committee -- that the tiny set-asides for small business could not be taken disproportionately from basic science funds. Further efforts at compromise, particularly with university groups, proved fruitless. Small business veterans knew a firestorm of opposition was forming. By the time the second session of the 97th Congress opened in January, it was clear the bill's rapid progress was over.
The opposition campaign was adroitly managed. A formidable series of procedural barriers to the bill's passage was built. For example, bureaucrats from the National Institutes of Health alerted university presidents and medical school administrators to the "threat." Both then turned to the third side of their iron triangle, their numerous allies in the congressional committees and staffs controlling medical research funds. Six committee chairmen, with the backing of their respective bureaucratic and lobbyist pals, asked for -- and got -- "sequential referral." Sequential referral is a congressional tactic that can delay indefinitely a measure that has the support of a majority of the House and even the party leaderships.It works like this: A committee chairperson will claim a measure falls within the committee's jurisdiction. The committee has, he or she says, the right to consider it and report it out. The Parliamentarian then refers the bill "in sequence" to each committee that claims to have jurisdiction. Rarely do more than two or three committees get into the act, but by the time they're through, the session may well be over and the measure dead.
Since the legislation dealt with R&D in many agencies, in theory every committee in the House could ask for referral. Unless the House leadership supported the right of the Small Business Committee to get to the floor quickly, the bill would die with the end of the 97th Congress. But, Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D-Mass.) insisted, the matter of sequential referral was entirely up to the House Parliamentarian. The six committees began to hold hearings, and neither they nor their staffs were gentle with small business witnesses. These witnesses were given, grudgingly, their chance to testify at the end of the day. More frequently than not, by design, they spoke before empty chairs or to one or two especially sympathetic members.
The opposition would have been happy to achieve either of two goals: crippling the bill with amendments or delaying full debate until the session was over.
Another opposition tactic was to manipulate the iron triangles into mutually beneficial alliances. A typical scenario would go something like this: "If you guys in Energy and Commerce who want to exempt the health agencies from the bill will support those in Armed Services who want to exempt the military, they'll support you. We can gradually gut the entire bill by exempting every major agency." As a third tactic, the coalition hammered away at the liberals and conservatives. Platoons of crybabies in white coats wailed to the liberals that the bill would complete "Reagan's budgetary attack on health, science, and education." On the other side, opponents whispered to conservatives that the bill meant, after all, that old devil, "set-asides."
The coalition also had a few more arrows in its quiver. One tactic, for example, was using the personal physicians of members of Congress. At least two New England small business supporters were lobbied this way. Each was asked by his own doctor to "show some gratitude for what the miracles of modern medicine have done for you. Give us at least one vote on one amendment." Each one did.
As the opposition strategy became clearer, so did small business's conviction that it could not afford either a loss or a draw. The stakes were now higher than the bill itself. If the small business constituency did not go to bat for its own Small Business Committee, it would be viewed as weak, cowardly, irresponsible, or worse, inept. Small business would lose the hard-won gains it had achieved over the past two years. Individuals and association staffers began to meet more frequently with people on the Hill and with one another. The tempo picked up as the sequential referral strategy unfolded.
Small business won. The final vote was 353-57, with 25 not voting, a tally representing a smashing victory. Or was it? All four efforts to weaken the bill with amendments failed. But if every member of the House who voted for one of these amendments had also voted against the bill, it would have been defeated!
The individuals and groups who came through for small business deserve your respect, your thanks, and your future support. If you were one of the thousands who helped them in this fight, you've helped not only yourself, but the nation. If you weren't involved, there will be other times and other fights. Plan not to miss any more.
